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A case study in central Zhejiang Province, China 
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Abstract 
 
Greenway implementation in city-regions is a collective action involving a complex range of relations 
between regional and local agencies, between government departments at the same administrative level, 
and between adjacent jurisdictions. This paper explores how greenway implementation governance is 
structured, and why different governance structures result in different greenway implementation processes 
and outcomes in a city-region. We use a case study approach to a greenway project in central Zhejiang 
Province (CCCZ), where data are collected through field reconnaissance, in-depth interviews, and 
document analysis. Preliminary findings reveal that the central Zhejiang Greenway Project has 
experienced a development from ‘territorially-specialized governance’ to ‘cross-scale governance’. 
‘Double-hatted’ agencies comprising government leaders and professional representatives from different 
agencies can create cross-scale institutional linkages both vertically (across levels of governments) and 
horizontally (across jurisdictions and departments), thus improving the efficiency in greenway 
implementation at a large scale. 
 
Keywords: greenway implementation, governance structure, double-hatted agency 
Introduction 
 
The focus of nature conservation has shifted from the protection of single ‘sites’ to the restoration of 
ecological ‘networks’ across boundaries (Ahern 2004; Jongman & Pungetti 2004). This is evident in the 
greenway planning sector, as numerous greenway plans have been formulated and implemented 
worldwide. Although greenways originated in the USA (Ahern 2004), they have recently been used as a 
planning tool in numerous Chinese city-regions, e.g., the Pearl River Delta Greenway Project and Xiamen-
Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle Greenway System. The rationale behind the greenway initiative is based 
on its capability to reconcile the competing needs between green space and land for economic use (Chung 
et al. 2018). To develop linear green space like greenways, some “residuals” of land can be used, such as 
riverbanks or drainage buffers which cannot be intensively developed because they are narrow or unsafe 
(Tan 2006). Greenways may also be developed to unleash the recreational potential of the land parcels 
utilized or protected for other purposes, for example, by inserting footpaths within greenbelts (Chung et 
al. 2018). In addition, China’s strategy for city-region development involves regarding greenways as an 
‘integrator’ to connect different settlements as a unity (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development 2016). 
 
Past studies reveal that governance structure is one of the main challenges in regional greenway 
implementation (Ryan et al. 2006). Three aspects of governance structure are central to greenway success 
at a city-region scale: regional control, inter-departmental cooperation and cross-jurisdictional 
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cooperation. Regional control aims at coordination of the overall spatial development. Though a regional 
government is not necessarily the solution (Siegel 1999), many scholars agree that regional agency’s status 
is relevant in determining whether the regional greenway program is strong and integrated (Erickson 2004; 
Ryan et al. 2006; Ryder 1995). For example, after studying the relationships between regional and local 
agencies in different greenway projects, Erickson (2004) classifies them into centralized, moderate and 
decentralized models according to their institutional structures. The centralized model features a regional 
entity with primary control over implementation. It allows for better inter-governmental coordination and 
a larger funding base from a wider geographical area. However, this approach may lack grassroots support 
and will be problematic when local municipals do not see the greenway project as a priority. In the 
moderate model, neither the regional agency nor the local jurisdictions have primary control over 
implementation. Leadership can develop among local municipals, thus encouraging coordination among 
them. However, the implementation may be slower due to shared responsibility across actors. The 
decentralized model allows local municipals to implement individual pieces of the greenway system while 
a regional agency acts as the advisory body. Strong local control means great grassroots support and a 
manageable scale. However, projects may not connect to their neighbors and a shared vision is absent due 
to a lack of regional leadership for coordination (Erickson 2004). 
 
Inter-departmental coordination allows for departments with expertise and considerable resources to 
perform their respective functions in a greenway project. In Singapore, for example, the Singapore Land 
Authority deals with land acquisition issues; the Land and Transport Authority makes greenways 
accessible to the public through the provision of public transport and road access; Ministry of Finance 
allocates funds for greenway construction and maintenance; and Tourism Board develops the tourist 
industry in harmony with the environment (Tan 2006). However, more often than not, some agencies are 
more cooperative than others in the working process, as a result of different incentives and disincentives 
(Thomas 2002).  
 
Inter-jurisdictional cooperation intends to achieve the level of greenway connectivity that is necessary for 
an integrated greenway network throughout a region. Due to the nature of regional greenways to extend 
across jurisdictions of which institutional arrangements are different (Hoover & Shannon 1995), their 
development calls for the coordination of local efforts. As local governments have a will of their own, it 
is likely that greenway priorities listed in the regional greenway plan have local issues which install 
implementation (Erickson 2004).  
 
Despite a large number of scholars that have realized the importance of governance structure in greenway 
implementation, few studies have treated governance structure in detail. There is little explanation about 
how greenway implementation projects are governed, and why different governance structures lead to 
varied spatial processes and outcomes. The goal of this paper is to explore the how and why questions 
associated with different governance practices and greenway implementation outcomes. Note that we do 
not aim to provide a comprehensive explanation of different behavioral and implementation outcomes. A 
large number of factors might make a difference in this respect. Rather, we focus on the impact of 
governance structure in particular. The cluster of cities in central Zhejiang (CCCZ), China was selected 
as a case study area. By analyzing data collected from field reconnaissance, semi-structured interviews 
with leaders in three levels of governments involved in the central Zhejiang Greenway Project, including 
the city-region, county-level city/county/district and the basic unit, and secondary information such as 
media reports and government policy documents, we found evidence that the central Zhejiang Greenway 
Project has experienced a development from ‘territorially-specialized governance’ to ‘cross-scale 
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governance’. In the cross-scale governance structure, the ‘double-hatted’ agencies play a key role in 
bridging organizations both vertically (across levels of governments) and horizontally (across jurisdictions 
and departments).  
 
In the rest of the paper, we first review research on governance structure associated with greenway 
implementation in China. This is followed by the development and presentation of a conceptual 
framework. Then we provide background information and data-collection procedures. After explaining 
the approach, we will present the original greenway governance structure of the CCCZ and its 
consequences, succeeded by an analysis of the developed CCCZ governance structure in recent greenway 
practices. We conclude with a discussion of implications for greenway policy 
. 
Governance structure in greenway implementation in China – what do we know? 
Several scholars have focused on China’s governance structure associated with greenway implementation, 
and there is a consensus that greenway implementation in China is steered by a strong top-down political 
mobilization (Lawson & Liu 2009; Liu et al. 2016; Xu & Yeh 2012; Yu et al. 2006). When studying the 
regional greenway project in the Pearl River Delta, China, Liu et al. (2016) found a three-level governance 
structure, including the city-region, the municipal and the basic unit. The regional authority acts as the 
primary promoter and coordinator by initiating the regional greenway plan and supervising greenway 
development. Municipal governments will receive length-oriented assignments from the region and 
subcontract them to basic level units which will construct and maintain the greenways (Liu et al. 2016). 
Scholars believe that such an arrangement is able to improve implementation efficiency (Liu et al. 2016), 
foster uniformity across cities (Yu et al. 2006 p. 236), and “re-invent regional governance” (Xu & Yeh 
2012 p. 396). However, there has been little supporting evidence of these findings. Moreover, as local 
authorities are obliged to fund, build and manage greenways within their boundaries, it is highly 
problematic to translate the regionally integrated greenway policy into greenway networks on the ground 
built by localities (Lawson & Liu 2009). Much uncertainty still exists about the relation between the 
regional level and the local level in practice.  
 
While most attempts have been made to analyze the vertical relationship in a governance structure, little 
attention has been paid to the horizontal linkage, including coordination across multiple jurisdictions and 
that across diverse departments. This study aims to fill these gaps by analyzing the governance structure 
in much detail as well as its change over time, and therefore we may understand how governance structure 
functions in practice.  
 
Governance for greenway projects – a conceptual framework  
Figure 1 shows a conceptual framework to inquire into the governance structure associated with greenway 
project implementation. Multiple agencies in local government shape greenway project implementation 
directly. At the feasibility study stage, for example, the planning agency will justify the alignments of 
greenways. The finance agency decides the source of money to fund the project. If the greenway project 
involves the conversion of rural land into construction land, it requires permission from the land agency. 
The water resources agency may conduct a flood risk assessment if greenways are built over the water. 
After the feasibility study is approved by the development and reform agency, the construction agency 
will invite tenders for the planning contract and the building contract. The government agencies involved 
are of different sizes, specializations and relational orders. For instance, the development and reform 
agency may be intensively interacting with the finance agency but less so with the construction agency. 
The sectoral and local governments also shape the characteristics of local agencies due to China’s Tiao-
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kuai system. The term ‘Tiao’ refers to vertical lines of authority that tie various sectors to the ministries 
of the central government. The term ‘Kuai’ represents the horizontal lines of authority that tie these sectors 
to their territorial governments. In China’s Tiao-kuai system, a local agency, for example, has reporting 
responsibilities both to its parent/local government and to the sectoral government at a higher level. The 
former primarily has leadership relation with the local agency (Kuai) while the latter mainly exercises 
professional relationship (Tiao).  
 
 
Figure 1. Governance structure vs greenway project outcome 
 
Agency characteristics and interactions are further discussed using ideas from Egeberg & Trondal (2018a). 
They summarize five organizational characteristics: size, horizontal specialization, vertical specialization, 
order of structures, and organized anarchy (Egeberg & Trondal 2018a). When applying their ideas to our 
greenway implementation study, we focus on the following characteristics of agencies. 
 
- Size, the number of positions that are involved in greenway implementation, indicates an agency’s 
capacity to oversee, coordinate, or implement greenway projects. 
 
- Horizontal specialization represents how greenway tasks are distributed horizontally among units. 
Horizontal task distribution may relate to territory, sector, process or targeted client (Gulick 1937). 
For example, Toronto’s greenway plan is formulated at the regional level and implemented by local 
government units which are internally specialized according to their territory (Erickson 2004).  
 
- Vertical specialization expresses the intended division of personnel across hierarchical levels within 
or between greenway implementation organizations.  
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- Order of structures decides whether a greenway implementation organization constitutes an actor’s 
primary or secondary structure. An actor is supposed to be more loyal and devoted to the 
organization constituting their primary structure, for example, a bureaucratic unit like a government 
agency. Secondary structure is defined as the structure to which an actor works as a part-timer in an 
organization, such as greenways advisory board or network. Primary structure may matter for actor’s 
decisions and actions while the impact of secondary structure is usually modest (Egeberg & Trondal 
2018a). 
 
- Organized anarchy means the greenway governance structure is open and unspecialized, so it allows 
different actors to move across organizational borders. Therefore, there are a variety of actors 
involved, facilitating information exchange and innovation. 
In Egeberg & Trondal (2018b) ’s another study, they discussed the role of ‘double-hatted’ agencies in 
transforming European Union (EU) governance from ‘indirect administration’ to more ‘direct 
administration’. These national agencies serve both national ministries and the EU authority, thus 
strengthening the coordination between the national level and the EU level (2018b). In China where 
government agencies are by nature ‘double-hatted’ due to the unique Tiao-Kuai system, one may expect 
strong coordination across levels. However, as their behavior is shaped by not only the competing policy 
expectations from two ‘hats’ but also their own characteristics, it is unclear whether these ‘double-hatted’ 
agencies function as ‘organizational bridges’ in practice (Egeberg & Trondal 2018b p. 17). In our case 
study, we will pay extra attention to the role of these ‘double-hatted’ agencies. 
Case selection and data collection 
 
Case selection and background information 
The selection of case study area, the cluster of cities in central Zhejiang Province (Zhezhong cheng shi 
qun, CCCZ), China, is based on the two major rationales set in Yin (2017): a typical case and a critical 
case. Specifically, in terms of typicality, it represents one of the city-regions in China having implemented 
a regional greenway plan. Despite city-regions in China might cross provincial boundaries, existing and 
planned regional greenway projects are likely to be in the same geographical situation as the CCCZ, that 
is, within the boundary of a province, e.g., the Pearl River Delta Greenway Project and Xiamen-
Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle Greenway System. Figure 2 shows that the CCCZ is in the center of a 
province (Zhejiang) and comprised of one prefecture-level city (Jinhua) which administers two districts 
(Wucheng and Jindong) and seven counties/county-level cities (Yiwu, Dongyang, Pujiang, Lanxi, Pan’an, 
Wuyi, Yongkang). 
5
Chen et al.: Understanding Governance Structures in Shaping Greenway Implementation
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2019
 
Figure 2. Location of the cluster of cities in central Zhejiang Province (CCCZ) 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on shape file from http://www.webmap.cn/ 
 
With respect to criticality, the CCCZ represents a critical case where two regional greenway plans have 
been launched and implemented during two successive periods of time; therefore, we can make 
comparisons by controlling various background factors. The first region-wide greenway system was 
conceived in 2011 and launched in 2013 when Jinhua Municipal Government (2013) initiated a three-year 
Greenway Network and Tourism Development Plan to construct regional greenways connecting nine 
districts/counties/county-level cities in the city-region (Figure 3). The goals of this regional greenway plan 
encompass conservation of ecologically significant elements, provision of scenic spots with 
interconnected trail systems, education about heritage sites, revitalization of rural economy and integration 
of the city-region. Twelve regional greenways were prioritized, with a total length of 1127.2 kilometers 
(Jinhua Municipal Government 2013). The interviews with three-levels of greenway implementors 
showed, however, that only eight county-level cities/counties/districts have implemented parts of the 2013 
plan.  
 
Nevertheless, CCCZ’s big vision stayed alive and active. In 2017, the Party Secretary of Jinhua sought to 
protect water quality, build dikes, develop greenways, create forests and improve eco-friendly industries 
along the ecological corridors, which in particular refer to the water corridors in this city-region. Following 
the conceptual ecological corridor plan initiated in July, a more specific greenway plan was launched in 
August 2017. In this new plan, the size of the proposed network has reduced by more than half (530 km) 
and therefore, greenway projects are doable at a manageable scale (Jinhua Municipal Government 2017). 
These new greenway corridors are organized along both sides of eight rivers in the CCCZ (Figure 4). A 
focus on water-based corridors may build a clearly-defined greenway vision in this region.  
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Figure 3. 2013 Greenway network and tourism development plan 
Source: extracted from Jinhua Municipal Government (2013) 
 
 
Figure 4. 2017 ecological corridor and greenway development plan 
Source: extracted from Jinhua Municipal Government (2017) 
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Data collection methods 
Adopting the methodology used by Erickson and Louisse (1997), we conducted 19 in-depth semi-
structured interviews with leaders in three levels of governments, including the city-region, the county-
level city/county/district and the basic unit (Table 1). These informants were selected based on their 
involvement in the two regional greenway projects. The interviews with them were used to understand 
their organizations’ roles, duties, strategies for regional greenway implementation, as well as their 
interactions with other organizations. Particular attention was paid to the differences between the two 
governance structures through which the 2013 and 2017 plan were implemented. Interview notes were 
transcribed into texts, which were further consolidated into common themes representing the five 
dimensions of governance structure we introduced before. By linking these themes to the core concept in 
this research, governance structure, we could understand why different governance structures result in 
different behavioral patterns and implementation results.  
 
Table 1. List of informants’ organizations 
Category Organization  No. of informants 
City-region Jinhua Planning Bureau  1 
Jinhua Construction Bureau  1 
CCCZ Ecological Corridor Development Office  2 
County-level 
city/county/district 
Wucheng Construction Bureau  2 
Jindong Transportation Bureau  3 
Yiwu Construction Bureau  2 
Dongyang Ecological Corridor Working Group  2 
Pujiang Construction Bureau  3 
Basic unit Langya Town Government  1 
Hangping Town Government  1 
Houzhai Sub-district Government  1 
 
Apart from interviews, documentary evidence was used to corroborate and augment evidence from 
interviews (Yin 2017). We analyzed CCCZ greenway plans, regulatory detailed plans of greenway 
development in each city/county/district, greenway technical guidelines, minutes of greenway 
construction meetings, and news clippings appearing in the mass media.  
Original governance structure of greenway implementation: territorial specialization 
 
The influence of sectoral government 
Jinhua, the prefecture-level city in the CCCZ, has been facing the administrative pressure for decades. 
Although it is supposed to administer Yiwu, a county-level city known for its largest market of petty 
commodity wholesales in the world, Jinhua’ economy is significantly smaller than that of Yiwu, making 
its power base under serious challenge. Responding to political fragmentation, Jinhua has attempted to set 
up a regional agency to reshape scaler relations and realize a stronger regulatory power. In 2011, Jinhua 
established the CCCZ Development Committee to develop a list of three-year regional projects (2014-
2016). This committee comprises the mayor of Jinhua, the leaders of county-level cities/counties/districts, 
and the heads of all Jinhua government agencies. While the committee was responsible for making key 
decisions, the CCCZ Development Office was established to formulate regional plans, with its head the 
Director of Jinhua Planning Bureau (CCCZ Development Office 2015). The 2013 regional greenway plan 
was then launched. In terms of greenway implementation, the regional committee appointed Jinhua 
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Construction Bureau as the CCCZ Greenway Working Group to distribute greenway tasks hierarchically 
to local governments. The task for each local government was not clearly defined, as it was described in 
a three-year schedule that the greenway project system should be “basically in place within one year”, 
“linked with the municipal greenway system within two years” and “connected to the community 
greenway system within three years”(CCCZ Development Office 2015 p. 21). In addition, the Tiao-kuai 
system presented a challenge to the task assignment process. Organizations in both the Tiao and Kuai 
systems of governance are assigned to a system of ranks. Wucheng Government, for example, is at the 
same rank as Jinhua Construction Bureau. This means that Jinhua Construction Bureau could not issue 
binding orders to Wucheng Government; in other words, Jinhua Construction Bureau’s top-down 
assignment of greenway tasks was not compulsory. 
 
In summary, the greenway governance structure from the outset was marked by a strong territorial 
specialization (Figure 4): the regional greenways planned at the regional level were to be delivered by 
local governments which would then appoint local agencies to build portions of the trail according to the 
geographical area served. 
 
 
Figure 4. Original CCCZ governance structure of greenway implementation: territorial 
specialization. Source: Prepared by the authors  
 
The influence of parent/local government 
The territorially-based governance structure, characterized by local governments’ control over greenway 
implementation processes within their jurisdictions, has led to the 2013 regional greenway plan being 
implemented differently across territories. Two dimensions of variation have been observed. First, the 
agencies appointed by local governments to develop greenways are different. It is understandable that the 
construction agency was the key greenway implementer in most areas (e.g., Wucheng, Yiwu, Dongyang, 
Pujiang), as the coordinator of this project at the regional scale was Jinhua Construction Bureau. However, 
in Jingdong, the transportation agency was responsible for developing greenways, just as one of its 
officials said: 
The construction agency deals with the construction of public facilities including roads 
in the urban area. When it comes to road construction in rural areas, it’s our job. Most 
9
Chen et al.: Understanding Governance Structures in Shaping Greenway Implementation
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2019
of the planned greenways are in rural areas, and that’s why Jindong Government asked 
our agency to take a lead. (personal interview conducted from 2.00 pm to 2.40 pm on 
November 27, 2018) 
 
Second, the size of the built greenways varies across territories. Pujiang had built greenways measuring 
87.5 kilometers from 2014 to 2016, while only a few regional greenways had been constructed elsewhere 
during that period, scattered in the region1. Despite a priority list of twelve greenways within the 2013 
plan, many of these greenways had not been pursued due to local governments’ opposition. Lack of 
funding was the main reason. As greenways were supposed to be funded by each territory without much 
financial support from the region, local efforts might break down early at the project application stage. An 
official of Wucheng Construction Agency talked about his experience: 
Before 2016, we had not built a regional greenway. Wucheng’s government debt level 
was very high and many projects were rejected, let alone the greenway project which 
couldn’t generate profits. Under such conditions, we had to ignore the top-down 
assignment from Jinhua Construction Bureau. (personal interview conducted from 
10.00 am to 11.30 am on December 18, 2018) 
 
Because of such funding mechanism, the construction agency attached more weight to the concerns of its 
parent governments than to those of Jinhua Construction Bureau despite the fact that it was by nature 
‘double-hatted’. As expected, the influence of Jinhua Construction Bureau was weaker where the local 
implementer was not the construction agency, e.g., Jindong.  
 
Agency characteristics: size, specialization, order, anarchy 
During this period of time, the agency appointed by its parent/local government had sole responsibility 
for local greenway projects, e.g., the construction agency in Wucheng, Yiwu, Dongyang, Pujiang and the 
transportation agency in Jindong. The greenway projects, however, had become an add-on to existing 
workloads. There were several essential stages that the local agency needed to go through to develop a 
greenway corridor: project application, feasibility study, preliminary design, construction design, 
construction bidding, construction supervision, and project acceptance. The local agency was so small in 
size that they might not be able to manage all greenway projects from the beginning to the end. An official 
of Pujiang Construction Agency described how his organization dealt with this situation: 
We were unable to finish all the planned greenway projects in Pujiang. There were more 
than 10 greenway projects. Instead, we asked the towns where greenways traversed to 
build these trails when we finished the preliminary design. The tasks were distributed 
but we gradually found that the greenways they built were not of high quality since they 
were not specialized in construction. (personal interview conducted from 2.00 pm to 
3.30 pm on December 20, 2018) 
 
Horizontally, multiple government agencies were relevant to greenway implementation, but there was no 
mechanism through which their efforts could be coordinated and active. Moreover, local greenway 
implementer, either the construction agency or the transportation agency, was lower in status than other 
agencies with considerable resources, such as the development and reform agency, the finance agency and 
the land agency. The inequalities of influence between local government agencies could hamper inter-
                                                 
1 Data source: interviews with greenway implementers in Pujiang, Yiwu, Dongyang, Jindong and Wucheng. 
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departmental cooperation and result in project delays. Pre-construction activities including getting all 
relevant agencies’ permissions for greenway development would take half a year1, and it might longer if 
agencies had competing policy expectations. For a local greenway implementer, its parent government 
funded greenway projects, thus making up its primary structure. The original greenway implementation 
was therefore structured by a strong government-agency control at the local level, with no ‘organized 
anarchy’. 
Recent governance structure of greenway implementation: cross-scale 
 
The influence of sectoral government 
In 2017, responding to the new 2017 plan to develop a regional greenway system organized around 
ecological (water) corridors, a cross-scale governance structure emerged (Figure 5). At the regional level, 
the CCCZ established an ecological corridor development advisory board of which members were almost 
the same as those of the CCCZ Development Committee. Instead of appointing an existing agency to 
implement the advisory board’s decisions, the regional committee developed a new agency, the CCCZ 
Ecological Corridor Development Office. One of its officials talked about this regional agency’s member 
composition: 
The CCCZ Ecological Corridor Development Office is a temporary working group 
aiming to improve water quality, build greenways, construct dikes… and develop eco-
friendly industries along both sides of a 396 km stretch of eight rivers. It calls for a mix 
of professional skills. 52 officials from a variety of relevant agencies have been 
transferred to this new agency. Most of them are the deputy directors in their respective 
fields like planning, construction, forestry, agriculture and water resources. They 
usually work part- time in this office, as they still need to administer their own agencies. 
(personal interview conducted from 10.30 am to 11.30 am on December 26, 2018)  
 
When locating leaders of diverse government agencies in this working group, it makes up their primary 
structures, so they are supposed to devote much time and energy to the central Zhejiang Greenway Project. 
Such an arrangement is characterized by strong inter-sectoral coordination. For example, most of the 
regional greenways along rivers have been developed through repaving existing pathways on dikes, which 
is the result of the coordination between the water recourses agency and the construction agency.  
 
In addition, the Deputy Party Secretary of Jinhua takes a lead in this working group, making it higher in 
rank than any local government, which further strengthens the territorial part of the governance structure. 
At the local level, each territory has set up an ecological corridor advisory board and a corresponding 
working group in the same way as the region has done. These local working groups can be seen as ‘double-
hatted’ (Egeberg & Trondal 2018b p. 8), which means that apart from serving their respective parent 
governments, they also find themselves directly linked to the CCCZ Ecological Corridor Development 
Office. An official in Dongyang working group described it this way: 
Every month I will report to the CCCZ Ecological Corridor Development Office on the 
progress of greenway implementation, including the location and length of built 
greenways along rivers, the projects under construction, and the degree to which 
                                                 
1 Data source: interviews with greenway implementers in Jindong and Pujiang. 
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greenways are linked to those in Yiwu and Pan’an. (personal interview conducted from 
10.00 am to 11.45 am on December 29, 2018) 
 
Note that improving the level of greenway connectivity across jurisdictions is a focus of recent work. 
Actually, it has become one of the key criteria when the CCCZ Ecological Corridor Development Office 
appraises each local working group’s performance at the end of each year. The result will affect all 
participants’ annual bonus and opportunities for promotion. That’s why local agencies in adjacent 
territories may sometimes form a network through which regional greenways at the border will be 
connected, e.g., Dongyang and Yiwu. 
 
 
Figure 5. Recent CCCZ governance structure of greenway implementation: cross-scale  
Source: Prepared by the authors  
 
The influence of parent/local government 
For each territory, the invention of the inter-departmental working group at the local level has been shown 
to affect the local government-agency relationship in significant ways: by locating the leader of local 
government and heads of multiple local agencies in the working group, it has become more empowered 
in relation to its parent government. As all the leaders of a local government are at the same time members 
of the local ecological corridor advisory board, they are likely to support the greenway development along 
water corridors. The substantial effort for the new regional greenway project has led to its early 
implementation success. By the end of 2018, about 356 kilometers of regional greenways had been built 
along the rivers, leaving only one-third of the plan to be finished in 2019. 
 
Agency characteristics: size, specialization, order, anarchy 
The size of a local working group is relatively small compared to its regional counterpart. In Dongyang 
Ecological Corridor Working Group, for example, Deputy Party Secretary of Dongyang is its head, 
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administering five officials from relevant agencies. Despite its small size, the local working group is 
higher in rank than any agency in the local government, so it has the capacity to improve inter-
departmental coordination. Another official in Wucheng Construction Agency described how a conflict 
between local agencies was resolved by the working group: 
At the feasibility study stage, I asked the permissions of both Wucheng Finance Agency 
and Wucheng Development and Reform Agency for greenway development. They did 
not agree with each other on the source of funds for greenways. The finance agency 
suggested me to use the money borrowed from banks as the government had a budget 
deficit, but the development and reform agency thought it would increase the 
government’s debt level, which would affect the local economy. I had been to these two 
agencies for at least five times but the construction agency was too weak to negotiate 
with them. Finally, the head in Wucheng Ecological Corridor Working Group 
interacted with Wucheng Development and Reform Agency and got its permission. 
(personal interview conducted from 11.30 am to 12.30 pm on December 18, 2018) 
 
When locating local government leaders in working groups, these agencies constitute the leaders’ primary 
structures. Since these leaders also have their positions in local governments, they could mobilize 
resources to implement the regional greenway plan. Another official in Dongyang working group talked 
about the working experience with her leader, the Deputy Party Secretary of Dongyang: 
My leader has regarded the ecological corridor project as his political mission. 
Although he is very busy in Dongyang Government, he spends at least half a day every 
week visiting greenway construction sites and resolving conflicts there. I make 
arrangements for his visit and record what he says as guidance for the group’s future 
work. The Deputy Party Secretary of Jinhua, head of the regional working group, speaks 
highly of my leader’s work. (personal interview conducted from 9.30 am to 10.00 am 
on December 29, 2018) 
 
There are signs of ‘organized anarchy’ in the new governance structure. A number of state-owned 
companies have actively participated in the construction of greenways. In Yiwu, for example, greenways 
along both sides of rivers have been built and managed by Yiwu Water Resources Construction Group, a 
company owned by Yiwu Water Resources Agency. They have brought innovation into greenway 
projects, e.g., the development of tourism industry along greenway corridors.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this study, we analyze three factors that are associated with the change of greenway implementation 
from ‘territorially-specialized governance’ to ‘cross-scale governance’ in central Zhejiang Province: 
sectoral government, parent/local government, and agency characteristics. 
 
Firstly, the sectoral government’s administration has become more direct. The local agencies appointed 
by local governments to build greenways were different previously, meaning that the sectoral government 
(Jinhua Construction Bureau) did not have the capacity to issue binding orders to them. Recent greenway 
implementation saw the invention of a regional working group for sectoral administration. It consists of 
the head of Jinhua Government and leaders from multiple government agencies. At the local level, a 
similar working group has been established in each territory, of which the leader is the head of its parent 
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government. It can be seen as ‘double-hatted’ because apart from serving its parent government, each 
local working group also finds itself directly linked to the regional working group. The regional working 
group steers greenway implementation processes by assigning tasks, appraising performance, and 
enhancing cross-jurisdictional cooperation. 
 
Secondly, the influence of parent/local government still remains significant, but positively. Early 
greenway practices have shown that implementation took place through strong local government-agency 
control. As funding was controlled by local governments, many greenway projects might break down at 
the application stage due to local governments’ opposition. Over time, though, the invention of the local 
working group has affected the local government-agency relationship in significant ways: by locating the 
leader of local government and heads of multiple local agencies in the working group, it has become more 
empowered in relation to its parent government. In addition, leaders of a local government are at the same 
time members of the local ecological corridor advisory board, and therefore they are likely to support the 
greenway development along water corridors. 
 
Thirdly, local implementers have become more autonomous, sectorally-specialized, powerful, and 
inclusive. In early greenway practices, the agency appointed by its parent/local government had sole 
responsibility for local greenway projects, and consequently, its workloads were extremely heavy. In 
addition, the local implementer was lower in status compared with other government agencies which had 
considerable resources. The inequalities of influence between them could hamper inter-departmental 
cooperation and result in project delays. Recently, instead of using an existing agency as the sole 
implementer, each territory developed an interdepartmental working group to share responsibility and 
improve cross-sectoral cooperation. In order to foster a shared perspective, leaders of the local government 
and multiple agencies have their positions in this group, which constitutes their primary structures. There 
are also signs of ‘organized anarchy’ in the new governance structure, with some state-owned companies 
actively participating in greenway projects. However, minimal public participation and little grassroots 
support may present challenges to future greenway implementation. 
 
These findings confirm that the ‘double-hatted’ agency is the crucial element in cross-level coordination 
(Egeberg & Trondal 2018b). The administrative status of such a ‘double-hatted’ agency, however, 
requires more attention. In China where the government agency is by nature ‘double-hatted’ due to the 
unique Tiao-Kuai system, one may expect strong coordination across levels. However, early greenway 
practices have shown that local agencies attach more weight to the concerns of their parent governments 
than to those of higher-level agencies, and this is why greenway implementation still took place through 
local government-agency control. However, such a strong control has recently been challenged by the 
newly-established ‘double-hatted’ agencies at the local level. Leaders of these agencies are at the same 
time heads of their parent governments, thus making these agencies capable of mobilizing local resources 
to implement regional greenway plan. In addition, the direct linkage across levels has provided the 
regional agency with an opportunity to improve inter-jurisdictional coordination and achieve uniform 
implementation. Another implication is that representatives of relevant agencies could find their positions 
in the ‘double-hatted’ agency, which provides a platform for inter-departmental coordination. 
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